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' entral to the current welfare 
reform debate is how best to get people 
off welfare and into jobs. The current 
choice is between long-term training and 
education and short-term job search 
assistance and employability skills. 
Previous attempts at revamping the 
welfare system, such as the JOBS 
program under Family Support Act of 
1988 and the Work Incentive (WIN) 
program in the early 1980s, emphasized 
longer-term training and education. While 
these programs have proven to have 
significant but modest impacts for 
participants, they are relatively more 
expensive and time consuming than rapid 
employment programs. Current thinking 
in Washington and among many states is 
moving in the direction of short-term job 
search assistance as the preferred way off 
welfare.
Several states have not waited for 
Congress to come to any conclusion. 
Michigan started a program, called Work 
First, in October 1994 that focuses on 
providing AFDC recipients with short- 
term job search assistance and 
employability skills. The Upjohn Institute 
administers the Work First program, 
along with six JTPA training programs for 
the local area. One of the JTPA programs, 
Title II-A adult training program, is 
targeted to the economically
disadvantaged, many of whom are 
welfare recipients.
Work First and the JTPA training 
programs apply different philosophies to 
pursuing the common goal of getting 
people into jobs. The first stresses rapid 
job placement; the latter emphasizes long- 
term job retention and career mobility. No 
rigorous analysis of Work First has been
Comparing the performance of 
Work First and the JTPA II-A 
training programs offers some 
insight into whether short-term 
employability skills alone are as 
effective as longer-term skills 
training in getting welfare 
recipients back to work.
conducted. However, the fact that the two 
programs are administered 
simultaneously by the Institute and that 
they serve clients with similar 
characteristics in the same local labor 
market presents an opportunity to make a 
few preliminary comparisons. This 
articles compares performance measures 
of the two programs to offer a few
(continued on p. 3)
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From the 
Executive Director
This year, to help celebrate its 50th 
Anniversary, the Upjohn Institute 
inaugurated a dissertation award for the 
best Ph.D. thesis on employment-related 
issues. The response was tremendous. We 
received many excellent dissertations 
from students who wrote on a variety of 
topics. To reflect the Institute's mission of 
pursuing policy-relevant research, 
committee used the following criteria to 
evaluate the dissertations: policy 
relevance, technical quality of the 
research, potential impact on real-world 
employment problems, and presentation.
An important consideration in the 
selection was balance among the four 
criteria. Some dissertations were clearly 
superior with respect to technical 
competence but were not as relevant to 
employment policy; others stood out in 
addressing burning policy issues but were 
not as central to employment issues.
I am pleased to announce that the first- 
prize winner of the 1995 Dissertation 
Award is David Jaeger of the University 
of Michigan. The two honorable mention 
recipients are Anne Morrison Piehl of 
Princeton University and Matthew 
Slaughter of MIT.
David Jaeger, now at the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, wrote three essays that 
examine the role of educational and skill 
attainment in the labor market. One of his 
essays, "Skill Differences and the Effect 
of Immigrants on the Wages of Natives," 
addresses whether the influx of immigrant 
labor during the 1980s has had a 
significant effect on the wage structure of 
natives. The increase in immigration is 
one of several explanations put forth for 
the decline in real wages among low- 
skilled workers and for the increase in the 
wage gap between workers of different 
education levels during the last two 
decades. However, previous studies have 
yielded mixed conclusions. Mr. Jaeger 
approaches this issue in two steps. He first 
finds that immigrants and natives within
narrow skill levels are nearly perfect 
substitutes in production. Based on this 
finding, he then estimates a production 
function to examine the effects of changes 
in the supply of immigrants on the wage 
structure of natives. He finds that 
immigration accounts for nearly half the 
decline in real wages among high school 
dropouts, but contributes little to the 
growing wage gap between high school 
and college educated natives. These 
impacts differ markedly across cities, 
with immigration into Miami, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco having the 






Mr. Jaeger's second essay, "Degrees 
Matter: New Evidence on the Sheepskin 
Effects in the Returns to Education," 
addresses a problem that has plagued 
labor economists when estimating the 
advantage of education on earnings. Most 
data sets record only years of education, 
but the number of years of schooling does 
not necessarily indicate when and if a 
degree has been obtained. Using a unique 
data set that has actual records of degrees 
obtained along with years of education, 
Mr. Jaeger finds that the estimated 
diploma effect is significant. For example, 
a bachelor's degree earns 33 percent more 
than simply four years of "some college."
Anne Piehl, who is now at Harvard 
University's Kennedy School, confronts 
the mounting problem of what can be 
done to curb the increase in criminal 
behavior, particularly among the lower- 
educated. As she states in her dissertation 
entitled Economic Issues in Crime Policy, 
expanding prison populations and the
lingering skepticism about the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation have led to 
the development of less-expensive modes 
of supervision. Professor Piehl's 
dissertation provides strong evidence that 
education does reduce criminal behavior. 
She shows that inmates who have 
completed an adult basic or high school 
education program while in prison are 
significantly less likely to be 
reincarcerated four years after release. 
Also, recidivism is lower for those 
inmates with higher levels of education 
before entering prison. She also finds that 
youths with more schooling are less likely 
to commit crimes and be convicted. In 
addition, her results suggest that public 
perception that immigration is associated 
with higher crime rates is unfounded.
Matthew Slaughter, a professor at 
Dartmouth University, investigates 
whether international trade has 
contributed to sluggish real wage growth 
and increasing wage inequality during the 
last two decades. The title of his first 
chapter, "International Trade and 
American Wages in the 1980s: Giant 
Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?" reflects 
the rhetoric and perceptions expressed 
during the last presidential election. 
Professor Slaughter finds no support for 
these concerns. Rather, slow wage growth 
and rising wage inequality result from 
sluggish labor-productivity growth in the 
service sector and skill-biased 
technological change, domestic factors 
not foreign ones. His second chapter, 
"International Trade, Multinational 
Corporations, and American Wage 
Divergence in the 1980s," finds that 
outsourcing by multinationals has little to 
do with America's wage divergence.
The selection committee would like to 
commend the three winners and also 
thank everyone who submitted thesis 
summaries for consideration. We 
appreciate all the applicants' dedication in 
pursuing high quality research that offers 
valuable insights into current employment 
issues. We look forward to next year's 
competition.
Randall W. Eberts
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Welfare to Work
(continued from p. 1)
observations about the relative 
effectiveness of short-term employability 
skills versus longer-term skills training in 
getting welfare recipients into jobs. We 
then compare these measures with more 
rigorous evaluations of other similar 
programs.
Work First
Since October 1994, AFDC applicants 
or current AFDC recipients who meet 
certain criteria are required to be referred 
to their local job training agency. For 
welfare recipients in Kalamazoo and St. 
Joseph Counties, the local training agency 
is the Upjohn Institute. The Institute in
Michigan's current welfare 
system offers welfare recipients 
incentives to search for and 
accept jobs.... Participation in 
Work First is mandatory for 
eligible welfare recipients. 
Those who refuse to participate 
may find their welfare checks 
and food stamps cut by 25 
percent.
turn subcontracts with various 
organizations to provide the actual 
services.
The purpose of the Work First 
activities and services is to provide 
participants the skills, support and 
encouragement, and opportunities to 
obtain employment in the shortest 
possible time. Under Work First, each 
person develops a resume and receives 
instruction on proper techniques for 
completing applicants and interviewing 
for jobs. After clients complete the core 
services, they are expected to search 
intensively for work and accept offers that 
provide at least 20 hours of work per 
week at or above minimum wage. More 
extensive assessment and skill training is 
available through the local JTPA
programs, but these services are reserved 
for those who have extreme difficulty 
finding a job.
Michigan's current welfare system 
offers welfare recipients incentives to 
search for and accept jobs. They are 
allowed to keep the first $200 they earn 
each month and 20 percent over that 
without reducing their welfare payments. 
Clients are provided with transportation 
until they receive their first paycheck, and 
they receive health care, child care and 
other benefits for the first year after 
securing employment. Participation in 
Work First is mandatory for eligible 
welfare recipients. Those who refuse to 
participate may find their welfare checks 
and food stamps cut by 25 percent.
The II-A programs also serve welfare 
recipients, but emphasize longer-term 
training. As shown in table 1, the primary 
difference between the core activities of 
Work First and II-A is the longer-term 
training: occupational skills training and 
on-the-job training. Work First 
participants spend an average 3.5 weeks 
in the program, while II-A participants 
spend around 45 weeks. Another 
difference is that II-A offers more 
intensive job development services than 
Work First. Not all Work First 
subcontractors have offered job 
development services and some that do 
offer such service do not have separate 
staff designated for that purpose. This 
coming year the state is requiring 
subcontractors to provide job 
development services. Therefore, 
comparing the performance of Work First
and the JTPA II-A training programs 
offers some insight into whether short- 
term employability skills alone are as 
effective as longer-term skills training in 
getting welfare recipients back to work.
Comparing Program Performance
Experience in our two-county area last 
year shows that welfare recipients who 
participated in the II-A program had a 
slightly better chance of finding a job than 
Work First participants. However, the 
margin was not very large. Sixty-five 
percent of Work First participants were 
employed at the end of training versus 71 
percent of II-A participants (table 1). II-A 
participants had a greater edge in wages 
and hours worked. II-A participants found 
jobs paying $6.69 an hour and worked an 
average of 35.3 hours per week, while 
Work First clients who found jobs were 
paid $5.42 an hours and worked 30 hours 
a week. Consequently, the weekly 
earnings of Work First participants were 
only 70 percent of those of II-A 
participants.
Welfare recipients from both programs 
were equally likely to hold a job during 
the first few months after placement. 
Ninety days after job entry, 60 percent of 
clients from each program were still 
employed. However, during the three- 
month period, Work First participants 
experienced slightly higher wage growth 
and a greater increase in weekly hours 
than II-A participants. Yet, these marginal 
gains did very little to close the gap 
between the two groups. After 90 days, II- 
A participants earned considerably more
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than Work First participants ($250 per 
week versus $176 per week).
Evaluations of Other Programs
These results are consistent with those 
obtained from evaluations of welfare-to- 
work programs that use randomized 
experiments. In their review of these
of the Riverside County, California GAIN 
program to job development activities. 
Evaluations of the program reveal 40 
percent gains in earnings and significant 
increases in employment rates for eligible 
AFDC recipients compared to those in the 
control group. The GAIN programs 
offered by other California counties that
Table 2. Performance Measures of Work First and JTPAII-A Programs
Performance measures
Employment rate
Employment rate 90 days after placement
Hourly wage at initial placement
Hourly wage 90 days after placement
Hours worked per week at initial placement
Hours worked per week 90 days after placement
Weekly earnings at initial placement





















evaluations, Gueron and Pauly (1991) 
conclude that "selective-voluntary 
programs that provided higher-cost or 
more intensive services appeared to get 
people into jobs with somewhat higher 
pay, but did not make a consistent 
difference in the proportion of people 
employed" (p. 27).
However, the difference in outcomes 
between Work First and II-A may result 
from factors other than the difference in 
length and type of training. One 
difference could be the more extensive 
job development services offered to II-A 
clients. Professional job developers are 
likely to have better results in placing a 
client, since they typically have 
established rapport with employers, act as 
the client's advocate, and through 
experience can offer a better match of 
client to job.
Evaluation of California's welfare-to- 
work program, GAIN, suggests that job 
development makes a difference. Many 
experts attribute the phenomenal success
did not stress job development had more 
modest gains.
In addition, because II-A is a voluntary 
program, the skills and motivation of 
participants in II-A and Work First may 
differ. Without a rigorous experimental 
evaluation, it is impossible to tell how 
much differences in client mix in the two 
programs may influence the differences in 
average client outcomes. The 
impressions of Institute caseworkers, 
however, indicate that welfare recipients 
participating in the II-A program are on 
average more motivated than the typical 
Work First participant.
Conclusion
Observations of local welfare-to-work 
programs administered by the Upjohn 
Institute are consistent with evaluations of 
other programs. Rapid employment 
programs do about as well getting welfare 
recipients into jobs as programs with 
more extensive training, although 
earnings and hours worked are lower. The
question for all of these programs is 
whether rapid entry into the labor market 
offers future self-sufficiency. In most 
cases, the answer is no. Even the 
Riverside Program, considered to be the 
most successful welfare-to-work 
program evaluated to date, does not 
promise lasting results. Three years after 
entering the program, only 23 percent of 
the participants were still employed and 
off AFDC. Furthermore, the earnings do 
little to lift welfare recipients out of 
poverty. In California overall, only 20 
percent of the participants had annual 
incomes above the poverty rate after three 
years. For the Kalamazoo Work First 
program, the earnings are not sufficient to 
reduce the poverty rate to any significant 
degree. The average weekly earnings at 
placement, assuming clients work all 
year, would place a family of two at about 
85 percent of the poverty income 
threshold and a family of four at 56 
percent. Getting people off welfare and 
into jobs is a first and important step, 
however. Once work experience is 
established, additional education and 
training, either on the job or in the 
classroom, will help to increase earnings 
and job stability and lead to self- 
sufficiency.
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Christopher}. O'Leary
Performance Management 
of Active Labor Programs 
in Eastern Europe
nemployment in Hungary and 
Poland has risen dramatically since late 
1989 when privatization and economic 
reform began to accelerate. The overnight 
disappearance of the Soviet market and 
elimination of state subsidies and price 
controls transformed these shortage 
economies into labor surplus economies. 
Registered unemployment in Hungary 
rose from 23,000 in 1990 to 705,000 in 
1993 in a labor force of close to 5 million. 
Since then the Hungarian unemployment 
rate has fallen somewhat, but remains in 
double-digits, with total employment 
having fallen by 25 percent since 1990. 
Officially measured unemployment in 
Poland jumped from zero in 1989 to 16.4 
percent in 1994. During this period, 
Polish civilian employment declined by 
more than 2 million. Figure 1 summarizes 
these unemployment trends.
To ease the hardship associated with 
worker dislocation and to maintain social 
stability, the governments of Hungary and 
Poland acted quickly to create
unemployment compensation systems, 
along with a variety of active labor 
programs. Policy measures adopted in the 
two countries include nearly the full menu 
of active labor programs found in nations, 
with developed market economies: 
placement service, retraining, self- 
employment assistance, wage subsidy, 
public service employment, job creation 
investments, work sharing, and early 
retirement subsidy. These are summarized 
in Figure 2.
Since 1990, the Upjohn Institute has 
worked with the Ministry of Labor in 
Hungary to develop evaluation and 
planning procedures for labor market 
support programs. In 1993, the Institute 
initiated a similar project in Poland. The 
projects have been coordinated by the 
World Bank and the U.S. Department of 
Labor.
Given the disappointing historical 
experience Hungary and Poland had with 
central planning, both countries have 
sought ways to manage employment
Figure 1. Registered Unemployment Rate, Hungary and Poland, 1989-94
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policy in a decentralized way. In each 
country, the legal framework of program 
options is established by national 
legislation. Funding for employment 
measures is allocated to the provincial 
governments, which then implement 
specific program activities to address 
regional needs. To support decentralized 
decision making, while at the same time 
requiring accountability and efficiency 
from provincial governments, both 
Poland and Hungary are establishing 
performance-based management systems 
for evaluation and planning of their active 
labor programs.
The management systems include 
performance indicators specified to 
measure the success of each active labor 
program in the different provinces and 
local areas. The guiding principle in 
developing performance indicators was to 
emphasize outcomes rather than 
processes. This emphasis was particularly 
important in government agencies where, 
until recently, hoarding of resources and 
organization building had been primary 
goals.
The performance indicators focus on 
desired outcomes such as employment in 
private unsubsidized jobs. They are timely 
measures that can be readily implemented 
and should become a natural tool for 
managers. They are intentionally simple, 
so as to minimize the data collection 
burden on provincial governments. The 
plan is to adjust performance targets for 
the local economic conditions and client 
mix. Such adjustment will make 
comparisons across provinces and 
programs more fair. In addition, the 
adjustments for client mix should 
discourage provincial governments from 
attempting to boost reported performance 
through the practice of creaming— 
inflating a program's success rate by 
limiting services to only the most 
qualified applicants. By adjustment 
weights, performance standards will be 
relaxed for provinces providing services 
to low skilled, low-educated, long-term 
unemployed or other specified hard to 
reemploy groups. Such targeting of 
services will raise the social dividend of 
employment policy.
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In November, the Upjohn Institute will 
conduct training in performance 
management of active labor programs for 
all 49 provincial labor offices in Poland. 
In 1993, similar training was completed 
in Hungary for all 20 county labor 
centers.
the effective use and control of the 
decentralized Employment Fund.
One year after follow-up surveys 
began, a national conference on the 
experience with performance indicators 
was held at the National Labor Center in 
Budapest. Wide-ranging comments about




























1. Poland also has Intervention Works projects operated by private sector employers.
The experience of Hungary illustrates 
the process of system development. 
Following months of debate, providing 
users of the system a strong sense of 
ownership and control, consensus on the 
list of performance indicators was 
reached in October 1992. Deliberations 
involved representatives from the 
Ministry, National Labor Center, Labor 
Research Institute, Budapest University 
of Economics, three county labor centers, 
and the Upjohn Institute. To illustrate, 
performance indicators for retraining 
programs were specified to be:
Average cost per trainee employed at 
follow-up
Proportion of trainees employed at follow- 
up
Average cost per training program entrant
Proportion of entrants who successfully 
complete training
Average monthly earnings of trainees 
employed at follow-up
Proportion of employed trainees working in 
occupation of training at follow-up
The performance indicators system 
was then pilot tested in three Hungarian 
counties. Despite some reluctance at 
senior management levels, nationwide 
implementation of performance 
management began in 1994. The impetus 
to set the system in motion came from a 
1993 Auditor General report questioning
the system were offered from the 20 
counties and from federal representatives. 
Due to the impact on survey response 
rates and the minimal dispersion in 
occupational wage distribution, the 
reemployment wage indicator of . 
reemployment job quality was eliminated.
While the federal partners at the 
meeting assured counties that the 
performance indicator results would be 
regarded as preliminary and used for 
developing an adjustment methodology 
for inter-county comparison, the counties 
themselves cited a variety of immediate 
uses of the information. The counties 
reported the information to be particularly 
valuable in assessing contract service 
providers. It was also noted that the 
impending reduction of active labor 
programs to four retraining, public 
service employment, wage subsidies for 
long term unemployed, and self 
employment assistance will likely 
simplify the system and speed 
implementation of the computerized 
system to support performance 
management.
The Ministry of Labor in Hungary is 
currently revising the annual planning and 
budget allocation process for active labor 
programs. Master plans for the counties 
and Ministry will be set in place and
guidelines for county annual plans based 
in part on program performance will be 
prepared. The Ministry is considering an 
algorithm which weights program 
performance 10 percent in budget 
allocation decisions. Guidelines for 
performance-based contracts to service 
providers are also under consideration. 
The Ministry is pursuing a positive 
approach to performance management by 
emphasizing high performance, with the 
likely response to poor performance 
being management assistance to counties.
In the past, the transfer of knowledge 
about employment policy has been from 
the mature market economies to the less- 
developed countries. Even the 
performance management systems 
developed in Hungary and Poland are 
adapted from methods used in nations 
with developed market economies. But 
because programs in Hungary and Poland 
are operated in a coordinated way, the 
systems provide a simultaneous view of 
the effectiveness of all programs, thereby 
clearly revealing policy trade-offs. These 
management systems are models for 
other nations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and they may also provide 
insights for nations with much longer 
histories of employment policy.
Christopher J. O'Leary is a senior economist 
at the Upjohn Institute.
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Program evaluation is a vital phase 












effects of past 







random assignments to comparison 
groups provide reliable estimates of 
program impact. But this technique 
cannot be used in all situations.
Recognizing the need for practical 
alternatives to experimental 
evaluations, as well as the drawbacks 
to the various nonexperimental 
evaluation techniques, the authors 
reintroduce the use of applicant-based, 
internal comparison groups. They 
update this methodology, which was 
first used in the 1960s, then test it 
against the random experimental 
findings derived from a controlled 
experiment.
This book is essential for anyone 
interested in evaluation methodology.
1995. 183 pp. $14 paper ISBN 0-88099-157-7 










Rising litigation rates in state 
workers' compensation systems are 
often blamed for the rising costs of 
workers' compensation insurance. 
Yet, until now there has been little 
empirical research on the 
characteristics of injured workers and 
their employers that affect litigation 
decisions.
By applying econometric analysis 
to case data from two states, Falaris, 
Link, and Staten 









cases, and the 
probability that a contested case is 
pursued to verdict. Factors identified 
that influence these litigation decisions 
include:
  state regulation of workers' 
compensation insurance pricing
  type of industry
  part of body injured and type of 
injury
  age of injured worker 
An overview of the evolution of 
state workers' compensation systems 
is presented, along with the reforms 
implemented to try to stem the rising 
incidence of litigation.
1995. 137 pp. $14 paper ISBN 0-88099-161-5 










Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Richard E. Walton
- , Harvard University
The authors present and analyze a 
dozen detailed case studies that point 
out the various 
strategic pathways 





display the two 
main change 
strategies  
forcing (a highly 
contentious strategy) and fostering (a 
highly cooperative strategy) that 
together account for two-thirds of all 
collective bargaining efforts.
Three cases document the use of 
forcing, the hard bargaining change 
strategy generally instigated by 
management and then matched by 
labor. Three more cases document 
fostering, an attempt to advance 
common or complimentary interests 
through attitude change, persuasion, 
and problem solving. Three cases show 
the use of sequenced forcing-fostering 
strategies, and three cases focus on the 
use of combined forcing-fostering 
strategies, the most complex 
negotiating pathway.
Finally, the authors examine the 
atmosphere in which negotiated 
change occurs by focusing on 
important environmental factors.
This book is from the preeminent 
authorities on industrial relations.
1995. 265 pp. $17 paper ISBN 0-88099-155-0 
$27 cloth ISBN 0-88099-156-9
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